

9 April 1963

TS-3856/X

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Photo Reconnaissance Requirements Over Cuba in the
Event Uninhibited Use of the U-2 is Denied

1. The following represents the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate of a minimum level of photographic reconnaissance coverage required over Cuba should uninhibited use of the U-2 be denied, together with a requirement for an appropriate stand-by high resolution capability.
2. Under the captioned situation above, our requirements for a rate of reconnaissance coverage would have to be adjusted in light of the circumstances surrounding such denial. However, our current program is focused upon a two-fold objective: (a) that of maintaining aerial surveillance of the land mass of Cuba, keyed primarily to identifying the introduction of strategic weapons systems and maintaining surveillance over established operational military deployments; and (b) that of pinpointing coverage of certain selected objectives of known or suspected Soviet occupancy. From a realistic point of view, clandestine reintroduction of strategic weapons systems into Cuba is still possible without detection by reconnaissance during periods of darkness. Therefore, the current and any future reconnaissance coverage of Cuba must be programmed so as to provide us assurances of identifying the transport, deployment and installation of strategic weapons systems and/or related military equipment after it is discharged from Cuban ports.
3. While denial of continuous U-2 overflights by the Cubans/Soviets might be associated with an assertion of sovereignty, from an intelligence standpoint we must be concerned with their engaging in clandestine activities of a critical nature which they would attempt to conceal through enforced denial of reconnaissance coverage.
4. Subject to modification in the light of prevailing circumstances at the time, it is considered that minimum photographic coverage of Cuba of a quality and resolution equal to that of the U-2 would be required as follows:
 - a. Coverage of the Cuban land mass during each ten day period in order to search for the operational deployment of strategic weapons systems. A program such as this would also provide reasonably current

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order of battle information. Because of the demonstrated rapidity with which the Soviets have been able to deploy mobile missile systems, we believe coverage on this order of magnitude would be required.

b. A stand-by capability which would be used to cover, on a selective basis, those objectives which reflect possible activities of critical significance and which may require more frequent coverage.

5. There should also be a stand-by capability which would provide extremely high resolution photography of pinpoint objectives which may be suspect as being critically significant military installations. This program would be necessary to assist us in making a more positive identification. The quality and timeliness of receipt of the photography obtained by this means should be equal to that provided by the low-level reconnaissance operations employed in the past.

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JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

cc: Chairman, JCS